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Reasons to Care about Reasons for Action:
A Response to Paul S. Davies
G. M. Trujillo, Jr.
Vanderbilt University
In eschewing the specialty-standards of neuro-babble and philosophical
neologism, Paul S. Davies (2016) argues with courageous clarity. He
connects issues in neuroscience and epistemology to problems surrounding
agency. I agree with many of his claims, but I think they need more
context and precision for application. This is because his argument as it
stands now affects only a limited set of theories, and a hidden modality in
thesis 3 tempers his argument further. And perhaps most urgently, if his
theory fails to address “top-down”1 mental processes or social dimensions
of knowledge, his argument fails to meet even his own goals set out in the
paper.
1. Questioning First-personal Reasons: Ethics, Law, and Neuroscience
Davies argues for a “modest form of skepticism regarding our knowledge
of our reasons for acting” (2016, p. 135). If successful, his argument
challenges the justiﬁcatory status of ﬁrst-personal reasons for action.
However, this ﬁrst-personal focus on reasons affects only a limited
subset of theories. For example, Davies’ argument frustrates normative
systems that rely on rationality as the justifying or principle capacity.
Davies chips the veneer of intellectualistic theories, like Kantian
constructivism (given its dependence on self-legislating reason) or Stoic
rationality (given that reason regulates the mind to achieve tranquility
against the body, passions, and world).
But other theories take no damage at all. If a theory does not rely
on reasons for action as fundamental, then it avoids Davies’ claims.
Normatively, a holistic Aristotelian virtue ethics, a Humean theory of
sentiments, or a Rossian intuitionistic deontology could parry Davies’
thrust (see: Hursthouse, 1999; Slote, 2010; Ross, 2002). Descriptively,
moral psychologist like Jonathan Haidt (2001) already make similar attacks
on rationality, agreeing that reason is often used in a rationalization of our
gut reactions after we act, not as a premeditated account of our actions.
His paper conﬁrms the suspicion that many ethicists and psychologists
already feel about myopic focus on rationality.
Additionally, the focus on ﬁrst-personal reasons neglects thirdpersonal ascriptions of reasons for action. For example, in law, courts
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do not rely on a person’s ability to give ﬁrst-personal accounts. Even in
crimes of ﬁrst degree murder, a defendant does not need to confess to a
crime or give certain reasons to be convicted. The reasons ascribed to a
defendant by the jury can meet legal burdens of proof to justify conviction.
Moreover, advocates of restorative justice might focus on more agentneutral or systemic considerations to amend injustice, thus making no
appeal to ﬁrst-personal reasons whatever.
Even neuroscience itself, the ﬁeld providing the bulk of Davies’
evidence, does not rely on ﬁrst-personal accounts of reasons for action.
Brain imaging technologies aim at ﬁnding an impartial, third-personal
way to observe the mind. Current technologies can measure the rough
emotional or affective states that underlie a decision or action. And maybe
rough states of mind are adequate for most enterprises. Pragmatic, clearenough reasons can be tested against predictability, diachronic consistency,
explanatory power, or success in achieving practical goals. The sciences
have long progressed without philosophical certainty or justiﬁed, true
belief. Neuroscience does not need Knowledge to proceed, only testable
hypotheses.
I admire Davies’ paper because it transcends mere academic worry,
and I think his theory packs a punch. But my preliminary comments show
its limited reach. With some footwork, he could jab at certain moral, legal,
or scientiﬁc domains, but he would need to specify (a) what reasons are,
(b) how clear reasons need to be for different disciplines, and (c) who
exactly this argument targets.
2. Challenging the Autonomy of Mind in Theses 2 and 3
My second comment addresses theses 2 and 3 in Davies’ argument. Davies
structures it as a hypothetical syllogism, so if one part of the chain is
broken, the conclusion does not hold. He argues roughly: if thesis 3 about
human neurobiology is true, then it shows how limited our knowledge of
our reasons for action is, proving thesis 2. And if thesis 2 is true, then we
must accept some form of skepticism as in thesis 1 (2016, pp. 135-136).
Alternatively: if neuroscience can show that at least one signiﬁcant neural
process prevents our conscious, attentive mind from knowing our reasons
for action, then we must hold a modest form of skepticism regarding our
own reasons for action.
Davies’ main support for our neurobiological limits is his
characterization of an autonomous, endogenous, ancestral mind. I
question, though, the strength of the autonomy ascribed to it. The relevant
claim I want to challenge is Davies’ assertion:
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So the case of Heather Joy, as well as the cases described by
Shewmon, vividly illustrate that we are born with endogenous,
autonomous affective systems. The effects of these systems
are not acquired via learning and they operate in the absence
of cortical input. It’s as if our mid- and lower-brain structures
comprise a free-standing mind unto itself. Panksepp refers to it
as our ancient mammalian brain. (2016, p. 141)

I take issue with two things here. First, I think there is a hidden modal
operator determining the scope of the autonomy. Instead of claiming
that sub-cortical systems simply do operate autonomously, the argument
should claim that it is biologically possible for human sub-cortical
systems to operate autonomously. Empirical evidence abounds, not only
in Davies’ examples, but in the cases of patients in persistent vegetative
states who still react to foot scrapes, and in patients who lead normal lives,
despite missing large portions of their brains.2 So, I agree that sub-cortical
structures in the human brain can function autonomously in at least some
cases.
However, the challenge of using cases like split-brain, anencephalic,
persistently vegetative, or neuro-developmentally atypical patients is
drawing an analogy from them to full agents. This is my second issue. In
the same way that biologists cannot apply all the insights from zebraﬁsh
or mice to human biology, philosophers must exercise caution when
extrapolating from neuro-atypical patients to full agents. Just because
parts of the human brain can function autonomously does not indicate
how autonomous these parts of the brain must be in more species-typical
patients. Difﬁculties compound when considering the plasticity of the
mind as well. So, while split-brain, anencephalic, or developmentally
challenged patients illuminate how some persons think, they may not
clarify how full agents think. It is plausible that lessons learned from them
will not strictly apply to the epistemically virtuous or the fully morally
responsible.
3. The Moral Importance of “Top-Down” Processes, and Friends
The real issue, however, is that philosophers have never disputed the fact
that parts of the mind seem autonomous when allowed to run freely. We
resort to our animal natures when uneducated. This is why Aristotle turns
to human souls only after addressing plant and animal souls (1984, 413a23
ff., 432a15 ff.), and why he painstakingly dissects competing faculties of
the mind and akrasia (2002, bks. VI-VII). More famously, Plato envisions
the human mind as a chariot with one good horse and one bad horse pulling

45

G. M. Trujillo, Jr.
in different directions (1997a, 246a-b). No one denies the existence
of the bucking, vicious horse, an analog for the sub-cortical processes
associated with the endogenous, ancestral mind in Davies’ argument. The
disagreement is about whether the charioteer—intellect or reason-giving
capacities—can rein it in.
This is why “top-down” processes are important to address. If reason
(likely some cortical process in the conscious, attended mind) can affect,
regulate, or train the subcortex, then it can maintain its executive status.
Sub-cortical processes need not be perfectly transparent to the agent; the
charioteer does not need to know the mind of the vicious horse. But,
reason needs to be able to regulate sub-cortical processes; the charioteer
needs to be able to train the vicious horse to trot on command. Relatedly,
in the presence of such a charioteer, the horse might not be autonomous
in the sense necessary for this argument to have its greatest impact.
Davies needs to address how functions of the cerebral cortex interact with
subcortex, especially the executive functions of the prefrontal cortex and
the theory of mind functions of the temporoparietal junction. Without
this, the argument relies on a hidden assumption: the cortex always
insufﬁciently regulates the subcortex.
Also, for the skepticism to hold more securely, the ﬁrst-personal
restriction merits expansion.
Over-emphasizing the ﬁrst-personal
knowledge of reasons for action belies the social nature of moral life
and information. This is why Plato’s Republic repeatedly emphasizes
education while deﬁning justice (1997b, bks. III-IV, VII), and why, to
deﬁne virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle spends one book on
justice and two on friendship (2002, bks. V, VIII-IX). Others, especially
friends, have privileged epistemic access to evaluating some of our actions,
and they help us to cultivate virtue. Moreover, we can use our interactions
with others to discover our own internal moral principles or reasons for
action. Aristotle even goes so far as to argue that we love others as we
love ourselves (2002, 1161a1 ff., 1169b34-5). There is a strong parallel
between others and ourselves in moral psychology and knowledge. And
when we observe them and they us, we learn new things about ourselves.
My three comments ask Davies to expand his argument. Thesis 1
sets out that he wants the skepticism to hold in “some non-trivial range
of conditions” (2016, p. 135). That burden might not be met without
addressing the ways the cerebral cortex can affect lower brain structures,
and without addressing the social nature of morality. However, if Davies
can show (a) the cerebral cortex cannot regulate the subcortex and (b)
third-personal perspectives do not ascribe sufﬁciently accurate reasons
for action, then every normative theory will need to regard the empirical
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literature more seriously.
Notes
I use “top-down” to refer to cortical processes affecting sub-cortical
processes. I do not use it as Davies does when citing Dehaene’s “top-down
attention mechanism” (2016, p. 136). I use “subcortex” and “sub-cortical” to
refer to non-cortical parts of the brain most broadly. Throughout, I do not mean
to identify the mind with the brain in a strict form of eliminative materialism. My
argument needs only that some states of mind depend on some brain regions.
2
See, for example: Yu et. al. (2014, pp. e1-e5). They review a case of a
24-year-old woman leading a life of relative normalcy—married, mother to a child,
integrated with her family. However, after going to the hospital complaining of
dizziness, physicians diagnosed her with “mild mental retardation and cerebellar
ataxia” (2014, p. e3), ﬁnding her cerebellum never developed and many areas of
her brain were more cerebrospinal ﬂuid than brain tissue. See also: Feuillet et. al
(2007, p. 262). They describe the case of a 44-year-old man—married, father of
two, employed as a civil servant. Complaining of leg weakness, he went to the
hospital, and brain scans revealed “severe dilation of the lateral ventricles” and
“a very thin cortical mantle and a posterior fossa cyst” (2007, p. 262). The scans
showed that most of his brain was cerebrospinal ﬂuid.
1
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